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Abstract
This paper studies Comprehensive Performance Assessment, an explicit incen-
tive scheme for local government in England. Motivated by a simple theoretical
political agency model, we predict that CPA should increase service quality and lo-
cal taxation, but have an ambiguous e¤ect on the e¢ ciency of service provision. We
test these predictions using a di¤erence in di¤erence approach, using Welsh local
authorities as a control group, exploiting the fact that local authorities in Wales
were not subject to the same CPA regime. To do this, we construct original indices
of service quality and e¢ ciency, using Best Value Performance Indicators. We esti-
mate that CPA increased the e¤ective band D council tax rate in England relative
to Wales by 4%, and increased our index of service quality output also by about
4%, but had no signicant e¤ect on our e¢ ciency indices. There is evidence of
heterogenous e¤ects of CPA on e¢ ciency, with some evidence that CPA impacted
more on less e¢ cient councils, and the "harder test" from 2005-8 having a much
bigger e¤ect.
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1. Introduction
In recent years, implicit explicit incentive schemes for public organizations, based on quan-
titative measurement of outputs, have become increasingly commonly used in the UK1.
For example, school league tables, hospital star ratings, and various schemes for local gov-
ernment, such as Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA), have been introduced
in the last twenty years or so. The focus of this paper is on CPA, the most important such
scheme for local government. This scheme, introduced in 2001, rated local governments
in England on the quality of service in six major areas: education, housing; social care;
environment; libraries and leisure; use of resources. Hundreds of performance indicators
and a variety of audit and inspection reports were collected, summarized, weighted, and
categorized so as to arrive at nal star ratings between 0 and 42.
As well as an evaluation scheme, CPA was also an incentive scheme. The stated
objective of the CPA was to target support at those councils that need it most, and to o¤er
a number of benets for better-performing councils, including elimination of "ring-fencing"
grants, and a three-year exemption from subsequent audit inspections3. Moreover, because
the results of the CPA were widely disseminated in the media, it was also an exercise in
providing voters with more information about the performance of their local council, both
absolutely, and relative to other councils. In turn, this, in principle, provides indirect
incentives for good performance. Indeed, there is evidence that councils which performed
poorly on CPA were punished by the voters at subsequent elections4.
CPA is of particular interest because it is, to our knowledge, the only explicit evaluation
1Schemes of this type have been little used outside the UK. There are exceptions: in the US, for
example, the No Child Left Behind legislation punishes schools nancially for poor test results, which are
made public to parents.
2In fact, from 2002-5, the rankings were designated: "excellent", "good", "fair", "weak", and "poor",
changing to zero to four stars during the latter part of CPA - see Tables A1 and A2 below. But, for
simplicity, we refer to star ratings thoughout.
3"High scoring councils were Councils that were performing well under CPA would enjoy reduced
audit and inspection regimes, and their associated fees, and be granted greater exibilities and borrowing
freedoms by central government. At the other end of the performance spectrum, a combination of audit,
inspection and other improvement work was to be commissioned as an outcome of the CPA process, with
the aim of transforming failing or poorly performing authorities." (Audit Commission(2009)).
4Revelli (2008) nds that an increase in one star rating increaes the probability that the incumbent
party retains control of the council by seven percentage points, and Boyne et al. (2009) nd "a low CPA
score (0 or 1 star) increases the likelihood of a change in political control".
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scheme to date, worldwide, that numerically scores and rewards elected representatives, as
opposed to public service managements. The purpose of this paper is to assess the impact
of CPA on local government in three dimensions: quality of service delivery, taxation
policy, and the e¢ ciency with which services were provided.
Figure 1 below shows the average CPA score achieved by English local authorities from
the beginning to the end of the CPA experience together with the average current local
expenditure. There is clearly a steady upward trend in average CPA star ratings. Indeed,
the Audit Commission declared o¢ cially in 2009 (Audit Commission(2009)) that the CPA
had done its job stimulating a continuous improvement in local government performance.
However, Figure 1 also shows that at the same time, expenditure by local governments
went up, more or less in line with CPA scores.
Figure 1: CPA Scores and Expenditures
So, the key problem is that we do not observe the counterfactual ; given the large
increases in local government spending over this period, it may be that service delivery
would have improved anyway, even in the absence of the CPA. To address this, we treat
the CPA as a natural experiment by exploiting the fact that it was only introduced in
England, whereas in Wales, where the structure of local government is the same, a much
weaker performance management scheme was introduced (Haubrich and McLean (2006b)
Martin, et al (2010)). In particular, in Wales, there were no quantitative rankings, much
less information published, and authorities also had a say with regard to the type of
inspections they would like to see for specic services. So, we use local authorities in
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Wales as a control group when assessing the impact of CPA on the treatment group, the
English councils.
What would we expect the e¤ects of a scheme such as CPA to be on service quality,
tax levels, and e¢ ciency? We develop a simple two-period political agency model in the
paper to look specically on the e¤ect on taxation and e¢ ciency of an incentive scheme
that both rewards service quality and provides information about this quality to voters.
In any period, the quality of a public good or service is determined by the politicians
ability, e¤ort, and tax revenue. In this environment, e¢ ciency measures the level of
service quality that can be produced at a given level of tax revenue. Voters value service
quality and dislike taxes, and thus they care about both service quality and e¢ ciency.
The incumbent faces an election against a randomly selected challenger at the end of the
rst period. Our key predictions are as follows. The larger the direct reward, or the better
the information, the more the incumbent taxes, and the higher the e¤ort he makes. While
higher e¤ort is not surprising, the prediction of higher taxation, which voters dislike, is
a distinctive feature of our theoretical analysis. As both e¤ort and taxes rise, service
quality is unambiguously increased by an incentive scheme. But, the e¤ect of either a
larger direct reward, or better information, on e¢ ciency is ambiguous, because inputs,
purchased by taxes, are also higher.
We then test these predictions, using Wales as a control group. Our results broadly
conrm the predictions of the theory. First, looking across a number of di¤erent measures
of revenue, the introduction of CPA appears to have raised council tax revenues in England
relative to Wales. For example, we see that the introduction of CPA raised the e¤ective
band D council tax rate by about £ 40, or about 4%, in percent in England. To test
the e¤ects of CPA on quality of output and e¢ ciency of local councils, we used specially
constructed indices of both, described in more detail below (see also Porcelli(2010) on the
e¢ ciency index). We nd, consistently with the theory, that the CPA raised our quality
of output index by 4% above what it would have been, had English local councils also
been subject to the same regime as in Wales.
But, again consistently with the theory, we nd that CPA either had no signicant
e¤ect on e¢ ciency, or lowered it, depending on the e¢ ciency index used, and the estima-
tion method. So, our nding is consistent with the story that local authorities reacted to
CPA by performing better, but also spending more. Therefore we conclude that CPA did
not boost e¢ ciency overall. This is in stark contrast to the view of the Audit Commission
(2009) that CPA has "done its job" e¤ectively.
We then look more closely at the impact of CPA on English councils. We do this in
two ways. First, we look for evidence of a "catch-up" e¤ect. That is: did CPA impact
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more on less e¢ cient than on more e¢ cient English councils? We nd that there is some
evidence of a catch-up e¤ect on output; output of English councils that were initially less
e¢ cient at the start of CPA increased by relatively more over the CPA period. But, they
also raised their taxes by more, and perhaps as a consequence, there appears to be no
catch-up e¤ect on e¢ ciency per se.
Our second approach notes that our theory predicts heterogenous treatment e¤ects of
CPA on e¢ ciency. With the available data, we are able to test three of these. The rst is
that the e¢ ciency e¤ect of CPA is more likely to be negative, the larger the percentage
of the population paying a reduced or zero rate of property tax. The second is that a
less generous reward for service quality should increase the e¢ ciency e¤ect of CPA. The
third is that the degree of electoral competition will e¤ect the e¢ ciency e¤ect of CPA; we
nd that this e¤ect is weakly negative. We nd some empirical support for all of these,
although the evidence in favour of the third is rather weak.
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 surveys related literature.
Section 3 gives a brief overview of CPA. Section 4 develops the theoretical framework,
and Section 5 describes our empirical strategy. Sections 6 and 7 give the baseline results
and results on heterogenous treatment e¤ects respectively, and Section 8 concludes.
2. Related Literature
There are several related literatures. First, there is an academic literature on the CPA
itself. Boyne(2009) and Revelli(2008) have already been mentioned in the introduction.
Revelli (2010) is perhaps the most closely related. In this last paper Revelli studies the
link between council spending and CPA scores. In particular, he nds that spending in
excess of the standard set by central government (standard spending assessment), can
have a negative e¤ect on the CPA score. His theoretical explanation for this is that
some councils are more e¢ cient than others in transforming expenditure into CPA scores.
Moreover, he assumes that all councils have the same relative preferences for CPA scores
and spending. In this environment, other things equal, a more e¢ cient council will both
spend less and achieve a higher CPA score.
In contrast, our paper constructs an explicit index of e¢ ciency, independent of CPA,
and asks how the introduction of CPA a¤ects the e¢ ciency of English councils, relative to
Welsh ones. So, the two papers are quite di¤erent; we are more interested in the incentive
e¤ects of CPA, whereas Revelli(2010) is focussing on CPA as a measure of performance or
outcome. Basically, as explained in the previous Section, we do not believe that the CPA
is a good measure of either output or e¢ ciency: rather, we are studying how it performed
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as an incentive scheme.
A second related literature is the wider one on incentives in the public sector. This
is surveyed by Burgess and Ratto(2003). Most relevant to our study is very recent and
independent work by Burgess et. al. (2010). They use the abolition of school league tables
in Wales (but not in England) in 2002 as a natural experiment to estimate the e¤ect of
league tables on secondary school performance. This is closely related to our study because
one of the output indicators we use is the proportion of secondary school pupils achieving
GCSE grades A to C in the local authority. Clearly, as CPA was introduced in England
in the same year as school league tables were abolished in Wales, we cannot separately
identify the e¤ect of both reforms on school "output". To deal with this problem, we
also test whether CPA increased our output index excluding education. We nd that the
e¤ect of CPA is still signicantly positive but smaller in magnitude. This is consistent
with a story where both CPA and school league tables have positive e¤ects on output.
Also related are Propper et al (2008), (2008a), and Besley, Bevan and Burchardi(2009),
which are papers investigating the e¤ect of the hospital star rating regime in England over
2001-5 on waiting times for hospital treatment, using either Scotland and Wales as control
groups. The hospital star rating regime is similar in form to CPA, with good performance
closely tied to reducing waiting lists. All three of these papers nd strong evidence that
the scheme had the desired e¤ect on the targeted "output" i.e. waiting times were reduced
in England relative to Scotland and Wales, although waiting times fell everywhere due
to higher spending. Note also that all the papers just discussed only focus on single
dimensions of local government "output"; unlike us, they do not address e¢ ciency issues,
or look at taxation.
Finally, our theoretical model modestly extends a literature on principal-agent prob-
lems where the agent has several tasks to perform, initiated by the classic paper of
Holmstrom-Milgrom(1991). Holmstrom and Milgrom, however, restrict attention to a
static framework, where monetary incentives can be used in an unrestricted way, and
where the agents payo¤ is exponential in money. Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole(1999)
extend that analysis to a career concerns framework, i.e. where the agent is rewarded not
explicitly, but in proportion to their ability as inferred by the principal. There have been
a few extensions5 of the multi-task career concerns framework to political principal-agent
5Less closely related contributions include Besley(2004), Caselli and Morelli(2004), Messner and Pol-
born(2004), Mattozzi and Merlo(2008). These papers mostly focus on the e¤ect of pay (xed, not
performance-related) on the incentive for di¤erent types of politicians to run for o¢ ce. Besley(2004) also
looks at the e¤ect of varying pay on incentive and selection e¤ects of elections.
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problems, notably Gersbach(2008) and Alesina and Tabellini(2008). However, unlike us,
neither of these papers allow for a specic reward being o¤ered for one task6.
3. The CPA - A Brief Overview
Local governments in England and Wales are of two types, unitary and two-tier. Uni-
tary councils are responsible for primary and secondary education, social care, housing
and housing benet payments, waste disposal, transport, and environment, planning, and
culture. Two-tier governments (counties) have the same responsibilities, except for hous-
ing and housing benet, and environment, where responsibilities are shared with district
councils.
In this institutional setting, the precursor to CPA, introduced in the Local Govern-
ment Act 1999, was the "Best Value" framework, which "provides a framework for the
planning, delivery and continuous improvement of local authority services. The over-
riding purpose is to establish a culture of good management in local government for
the delivery of e¢ cient, e¤ective and economic services that meet the users needs."
(http://www.idea.gov.uk/idk). A key part of this framework were the Best Value Per-
formance Indicators (BVPIs), which were numerical scores measuring the quality of the
above services provided by individual councils on various dimensions. Importantly for our
purposes, BVPIs were calculated for both English and Welsh councils.
CPA, which started in the 2001/02 nancial year, was a move to a stricter assessment
regime within the general Best Value framework. In the rst three rounds, the method for
assessing the current performance of a council was the following. Performance of councils
was assessed in seven categories7 (social care; environment; libraries and leisure; use of
resources; education; housing; housing benet payments). Where available, performance
was assessed through already existing judgements from inspectorates and auditors, such
as those by O¢ ce for Standards in Education (Ofsted) and Department for Education and
Skills (DfES) for education. These were augmented with BVPIs. All this information was
aggregated to obtain a score between 1 and 4 for each of the service blocks (with 1 being the
6Alesina and Tabellini study a sequence of models where the incumbent politician assigns e¤ort to
two tasks, and the level of performance on each task is fully observable, and depends additively on e¤ort
and ability, as in our setting. But, the main focus is on redistributive policies; each of two voter groups
only benets from the performance on one task, and the politician can make a transfer between these two
groups. Finally, Gersbach(2008) considers a political agency model with moral hazard only, i.e. where
politicians do not di¤er in ability, and where voters are able to precommit to a re-election rule.
7The CPA did not evaluate transport and planning.
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lowest and 4 the highest). The scores were then weighted so that the scores for education
and social services count four times, housing and environmental services twice, with the
remaining blocks counting only once. These were then added up to produce a performance
score of between 15 and 60 points, or 12 and 48 points for shire county councils (because
they do not provide, and are therefore not assessed on, housing or benets services). The
performance scores were then aggregated to produce a performance rating of between 1
and 4 for each authority as shown in Table A2 of the Appendix. This score was then
combined with an estimate the councilsability to improve (1 to 4) as explained in the
Table A2 of the Appendix to produce the nal CPA score.
In 2005, a new methodology, the "harder test" was introduced. The current perfor-
mance of the LA was now assessed in the same categories with the exclusion of education,
which was dropped. The main innovation, however, involved the aggregation procedure
where the ability to improve was replaced by the corporate assessment, a three year period
assessment of the councils ability "to lead its local community having clearly identied
its needs and set clear ambitions and priorities" (Audit Commission, 2009). Among the
service categories social care and use of resources received e¤ectively a higher weighting
than the other ve through the aggregation rule in Table A3 in the Appendix.
So, what are CPA scores really measuring? Along with some commentators e.g.
McLean et. al. (2007), we take the view that CPA is a hybrid measure, partly measuring
levels of service quality (thorough the BVPIs), partly measuring operational e¢ ciency (use
of resources) and partly broader aspects of corporate health or e¤ectiveness (ability to
improve). As McLean et. al. (2007) point out, there may also be "categorization errors"
in the aggregation procedure in Table A2, where ne numerical scores are compressed into
just four categories. So, we take the view that CPA scores are measuring both service
levels (output) and e¢ ciency, and are doing so with some error. In this paper, we are not
interested as CPA as a measurement system, but as an incentive scheme. That is why we
construct our own, independent, measures of output and e¢ ciency for local councils, with
the aim of studying the e¤ect of the CPA regime on this measures, along with taxation.
We close this section with some very direct evidence which suggests that CPA was
acting partly as an incentive scheme. Note from Table A3 that during the harder test
period, a score of at least 9 on so-called "Level 1 assessments" was a crucial threshold
for getting the highest possible overall score, given a xed corporate assessment. Also, it
was the case that corporate assessment scores were xed over a three year period , which
were also the last three years in our sample (see Audit Commission 2009b). So, over the
period 2004/5 to 2006/7 we would expect a "bunching" of scores on level 1 assessments
at 9. This is clearly the case, as the histogram below shows.
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Figure 3.1. Cut-o¤ points histogram, level 1 assessment.
Figure 3.1 shows the levels 1 scores by year and council both before and after 2004/5.
The years before 2004/5 constitute a benchmark, because a score of 9 was not a threshold
before 2005.8
4. A Theoretical Framework
4.1. The Environment
In each of two periods t = 1; 2 an incumbent politician produces a local public good at
quality level Qt. This depends on resources, in the form of tax revenue Tt; chosen by the
incumbent9, plus an exogenous grant from central government Gt; the e¤ort input of the
8In fact, before 2005, we do not know how the scores on individual services were aggregated to produce
the points scores in Table A.2, because this information was never made public by the Audit Commission.
9This captures the stylized fact that the Council Tax (a residential property tax) is the only major
tax instrument for local government in England and Wales. Over the sample period, due to incoming
the Labour governments decision to abandon "rate-capping", local authorities have had in practice
considerable autonomy to set their council taxes. The government reserves the right to direct an authority
to set a lower budget requirement if it considers that the Council Tax has been increased excessively.
However capping took place only in 2004/05 and 2005/06 for 6 and 8 local authorities respectively.
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incumbent, at; and also his ability parameter t :
Qt = ~f(at; St) + t; St = Tt +Gt (4.1)
where St is total spending by local government. We assume ~f(at; St) is strictly concave.
Also, following Rogo¤(1988), Alesina and Tabellini(2008), we assume that t follows a
moving average process i.e. t = t + t 1 where t is a random draw from a symmetric
distribution with mean zero, distribution H;and density h; and support [ ; ]. Symmetry
and zero mean are assumed for convenience only. At the beginning of t = 1; both the
incumbent and voters know 0:
There is a continuum of measure 1 of voters. Voter i 2 [0; 1] has linear payo¤s over
Qt and tax Tt of the form
ut = Qt   iTt; t = 1; 2 (4.2)
where i is i0s tax price of public spending, and may di¤er across voters. In England and
Wales, the only local tax is the property tax, so the natural interpretation of i would be
that voters property value relative to the average.
The incumbent politician, while in o¢ ce, gains some o¢ ce-related benets, R, and
also incurs a cost of e¤ort. We also assume he puts some weight !  0 on a weighted
average of voter payo¤s, either because he himself is a tax-payer and consumer of the local
public good, as would be natural in a citizen-candidate setting (Besley and Coate(1997)),
or because he is lobbied by special interest groups, or because he cares about his legacy
(Maskin and Tirole(2004))10. This of course nests the purely o¢ ce-seeking politician as
a special case where ! = 0: So, the politician in o¢ ce has payo¤
!(Qt   Tt) +R  cat; t = 1; 2 (4.3)
where  is the weighted average of the i: As the unweighted average of the i is one,
 < 1 if the politicians put more weight on poorer groups, for example. Finally, following
Maskin and Tirole(2004), we assume that when out of o¢ ce, the politician has zero payo¤.
The is an election at the end of period 1, described in more detail below. Also,
the incentive scheme is only used in period 1 and is described in more detail below. This
simplies the exposition, and in the two-period model, is without much loss of generality11.
Finally, although this model has been presented as one of an elected representative
being motivated by voters via an election, in the British context, there is an alternative,
10It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide micro-foundations for these processes.
11An innite-horizon version of this model is available on request where it is possible to distinguish
between temporary and permanent incentive schemes; the qualitative e¤ects of the two are similar.
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and possibly more plausible, interpretation12. Councils in England and Wales have the
following management structure; strategic decision-making is undertaken by an executive
comprised of elected o¢ cials, typically in the form of a cabinet with the leader elected
by council members, with day-to-day operations headed by a full-time CEO. One could
argue that CPA is also a management tool for the executive to monitor the CEO. One
can therefore re-interpret our model as follows.
Voters can be plausibly re-interpreted as councillors, who live in the council district and
who therefore have similar preferences to voters. The "politician" can be re-interpreted as
the council CEO, who can be red or otherwise sanctioned for poor performance. Thus,
the election can be reinterpreted as any action that the executive can take to discipline
the CEO. CPA is of value to councillors either because it gives them more information
about CPA performance (a higher q); or because there are direct benets to the CEO of
a higher CPA score i.e. earned autonomy. This re-interpretation is of course, applicable
to other contexts where there is also a clear division between legislative and executive
functions, such councilmanager local government in the US.
4.2. Political Equilibrium
4.2.1. Equilibrium in Period 2
Substituting (4.1) into (4.3), we see that the incumbent politicians expected payo¤ is
!(f(a2; T2) + 1   T2) +R  ca2
where f2(a2; T2)  ~f2(a2; G2 + T2). So, the politicians decision problem is characterized
by
V (1) = max
a2;T2
f!(f(a2; T2) + 1   T2) +R  ca2g  V + !1 (4.4)
where V (1) = V + !1 has the interpretation of the incumbents expected continuation
payo¤ at time 1, given observation of 1; but before 2 is known:
4.2.2. The Incentive Scheme and Equilibrium in Period 1
We begin by describing the incentive scheme. The politician gets a bonus B per unit of
output, i.e. BQ1. This can be interpreted as monetary or psychological. Obviously, the
second interpretation is appropriate in the case of CPA, as local o¢ cials - elected or not
- do not get any direct personal payment as a result of a good CPA score. Moreover,
12This was suggested to us by Tim Besley.
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in view of the important role in practice that CPA and other incentive schemes play in
giving voters better information, we assume that in period 1, voters only observe output
Q1 before the election with probability q: We suppose that this q can be increased by the
incentive scheme; we refer to this as the information e¤ect of the scheme: As Q1 appears
in the utility function, voters must observe it after the election i.e. at the end of period
t; if they do not observe it earlier. Finally, it is assumed that voters always observe T1
before the election, reecting the fact that local property taxes are highly "visible".
The order of events in period 1 is then as follows. First, politicians choose a1; T1;
knowing 0: Then, voters vote for incumbent or challenger, having observed T1 and, with
probability q; Q1: The challengers productivity is randomly drawn from the same dis-
tribution as the incumbents. Finally, at t = 1; voters and the incumbent both know
0:
First, consider the voter choice between the incumbent and challenger. We impose the
natural condition that this decision must be sequentially rational i.e. the voters cannot
precommit to a voting rule. Because distributional concerns, measured by , are xed and
the same across all politicians, voters only care about the productivity 1 of the incumbent
and challenger. Given this, voter behavior is easily characterized. First, given knowledge
of 0, it is easily seen13 that at the end of period 1; voters have enough information to
infer 1: So, once Q1; T1 are observed, voters infer that the incumbents type is
e1 = Q1   f(ae1; T1)  0 (4.5)
where ae1 is the votersexpected value of e¤ort choice by the incumbent.
Now, we assume that voters vote rationally, up to a random error. In particular, if Q1
has been observed, a voter votes for the incumbent if
e1 + "+ v  0 (4.6)
where " is an idiosyncratic popularity shock, distributed uniformly on [ 1; 1] and  is an
aggregate popularity shock, distributed uniformly on [ 
2
; 
2
], where  parameterizes the
variance of this shock: In what follows,  will be an (inverse) measure of electoral com-
petition i.e. the lower ; the more sensitive is the re-election probability to performance.
What if Q1 has not been observed? Then, the voters cannot make any inference
about 1, and so they are indi¤erent between the incumbent and challenger. In this case,
13Assume that voters know 0: Then, as voters have observed Q1; T1 by the end of period 1; and voters
also know that the incumbent has taken equilibrium action a1; they can infer 1 from the relationship
Q1 = f(a1; T1) + 0 + 1:
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we assume that they randomize between the two, so the incumbent is re-elected with
probability 0.5.
Standard computations (see Appendix) then imply that, conditional on t the proba-
bility of re-election for the incumbent is
p(a1; T1; a
e
1; 1) =
1
2
+
q

(1 + f(a1; T1)  f(ae1; T1)) (4.7)
That is, the probability of re-election is higher, the higher the actual competence of
the incumbent, and the higher output relative to output expected by voters. Note that
the responsiveness of p to an increase in a1 is proportional to
q

; i.e. voters are more
responsive to performance, the greater is electoral competition, or the more informative
is the incentive scheme. Note also that in equilibrium, where ae1 = a1; choice of T1 does
not a¤ect the re-election probability; this is because it is directly observed by voters, not
inferred.
So, given the re-election probability (4.7), at time t; the incumbent solves the following
problem
max
a1;T1
(
(! +B)f(a1; T1)  !T1   ca1 + 
Z 
 
p(a1; T1; a
e
1; 1)V ()h()d
)
(4.8)
where  < 1 is a discount factor, and V () is dened in (4.4). This has the interpretation
that the incumbent maximizes his current payo¤, plus his expected continuation payo¤,
if re-elected.
Then, the rst-order conditions to this problem, evaluated in equilibrium, where ae1 =
a1 are
(! +B + qV=)fa = c (4.9)
(! +B)fT = ! (4.10)
Note that (4.9) says that there are three motivations for the incumbent to supply e¤ort;
some preference congruence with the electorate (! > 0); career concerns, measured by
qV=; and nally the incentive scheme, B: Note also the asymmetry; career concerns
a¤ect the choice of e¤ort, but not tax, ultimately because the voters can directly observe
tax, but can only indirectly infer e¤ort.
So, given B and other parameters, the endogenous variables a1; T1 are simultaneously
determined from the two equations (4.9), (4.10) and V is residually dened by (4.4). This
constitutes a political equilibrium.
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4.3. E¤ects of an Incentive Scheme
Here, we establish our main results of the e¤ects of an incentive scheme. We consider the
e¤ects of small changes in both B and q on taxation, T1; output, the expected value of Q1;
and also on "e¢ ciency", dened more precisely below. Note that up to a constant, the
expected value of Q1 is simply f(a1; T1)  f1: Our rst result, proved in the Appendix,
is:
Proposition 1. If T; a are weak complements i.e. faT  0 then: (a) da1dB > 0; dT1dB >
0; and so df1
dB
> 0; (b) da1
dq
> 0; dT1
dq
> 0; and so df1
dq
> 0:
So, we see that a stronger incentive scheme, interpreted as an increase in B and/or q,
will unambiguously increase both taxes and expected output. Note also that this result
does not depend on the relative size of the direct e¤ect and the information e¤ect of the
incentive scheme. This is important, because in the empirical work, we cannot estimate
the e¤ects of B and q separately.
We now turn to look at e¢ ciency. In our setting, the natural measure of e¢ ciency,
and the one that will be used in our empirical work, is the expected output f1; minus
the cost of inputs, T1;
e  f(a1; T1)  T1 (4.11)
From (4.11), the e¤ect of B or q on e¢ ciency is :
de
dB
= fa
da1
dB
+ (fT   1) dT1
dB
;
de
dq
= fa
da1
dq
+ (fT   1) dT1
dq
(4.12)
So, we see immediately that an increase in B or q has a an ambiguous e¤ect on e¢ ciency;
there is a positive e¤ect via a1, but an e¤ect that can be negative via T1. Specically,
this e¤ect will be negative if the incumbent is already collecting too much tax revenue at
the margin fT < 1. In turn, from (4.10), we can see intuitively that this is more likely
to be the case if the bonus B is already large, there are strong career concerns, or , the
politicians disutility of tax, is small enough.
To pin down these e¤ects more precisely, assume that f is Cobb-Douglas: Then we
can prove:
Proposition 2. Assume f = aT ; ;  > 0;  +  < 1: An increase in q increases
e¢ ciency i¤ !
!+B
> . An increase in B increases e¢ ciency i¤
!
! +B
>
(2  1

) + (1  1

) qV
(!+B)
(4  1

  1

) + (2  1

) qV
(!+B)
(4.13)
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Note also that by straightforward computation14, the right-hand side of (4.13) is in-
creasing in qV
(!+B)
: So, as q; V;  only appear on right-hand side of (4.13), we see that in-
troducing a small incentive scheme, or increasing the incentive scheme by a small amount,
can decrease e¢ ciency if: (i) career concerns V are strong e.g. from (4.4), the ego-rent R
from o¢ ce is high; (ii) electoral competition is high i.e.  is low; (iii) if  is low, reecting
a e.g. low tax price facing the median voter; (iv) the incentive scheme is more informative
to voters i.e. large q. Some of these results may appear counter-intuitive, but they all
arise from the fact that the higher "career concerns", measured by qV

; the greater the
tendency to set a high tax in the rst period, in order to boost output and get re-elected.
In turn, from (4.12), if the tax is high enough, it can lead to lower e¢ ciency.
5. Empirical Strategy
5.1. Empirical Specication
Our empirical approach is to estimate the impact of CPA on e¢ ciency in a quasi-experimental
setting through di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimation, using Wales, where CPA was not used,
as a control group. Welsh local government performance was assessed by an evaluation
program called the Welsh Program for Improvement (WPI) since 2001.15 We believe
that Welsh councils can be used to address the counterfactual question of what would
have been the path of English councils after 2001 if CPA league tables would not have
been produced, for the following reasons. First, Welsh and English local authorities have
the same structure and functions.16 Second, the mean values of our control variables
and the input and output variables used to construct our service quality and e¢ ciency
indices are very similar in the two countries (see Tables A5 and A6 in the Appendix).
Third, as documented by Haubrich and McLean(2006b), WPI was, compared to CPA, a
much less prescriptive and elaborate assessment regime since only condential assessments
were produced, the evaluation criteria were based only on local self-assessment without
quantitative rankings, and no formal rewards or punishments were specied.17
14Let the RHS be f(x) = (2 
1
 )+(1  1 )x
(4  1  1 )(!+B)+(2  1 )x
; x = qV(!+B) : Then f
0(x) has the sign of 1      ;
which is positive.
15Information and data about the Welsh Program for Improvement can be collected from the web site
of the Wales Audit O¢ ce www.wao.gov.uk.
16All Welsh local authorites are unitary, but they have the same responsibilities as English local au-
thorities, and until 2006, the same funding structure.
17It is important to note that the greater regional autonomy obtained in Wales at the end of the
1990s does not interfere with our analysis since the The National Assembly for Wales was created by the
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As a further check, we test whether our identication assumption holds by testing
whether our dependent variables i.e. the Yit in (5.1) follow a common time path in the
years before the introduction of CPA in 2001. First, as a "visual" test, Figures A.1, A.2,
and A.3 in Appendix D show the common trend followed by the three main dependent
variables in England and Wales before the introduction of CPA. Moreover, using a formal
test, also reported in Appendix D, we nd that with a few exceptions, we cannot reject
the hypothesis that they did follow a common time path.
So, we proceed by estimating the following;
Yit = 1CPAt + 2(CPAt Di) + 0Xit + ui + "it (5.1)
where CPAt is a dummy that takes value 1 after 2001 and Di is a dummy that takes
value one for English councils. Also, X it is a vector of controls. In X it; we included
linear and quadratic time trends. These are general, not specic to each council, and the
results are basically unchanged if they are omitted. Finally, Yit = Tit; Qit; eit, where Tit is
a measure of revenue collected from the council tax, Qit a measure of service quality, and
eit a measure of e¢ ciency: The main parameter of interest here is 2 which captures the
treatment e¤ect of the CPA. The theory suggests that if Yit = Tit; Qit, then 2 > 0 but
if Yit = eit; 2 has an ambiguous sign theoretically.
We have two di¤erent treatments of ui: First, we treat ui as a council xed e¤ect. Then,
we treat it as a random e¤ect, estimated using GLS18. Finally, some of the variables (all
the outputs, and one of the tax variables) are between zero and 1, so also, as a robustness
check, we estimate a non-linear model where the dependent variable is transformed to
lie between zero and 1 as follows:
Tit = (1CPAt + 2(CPAt Di) + 0Zit + ui) + vit
using a pooled Bernoulli quasi-MLE,19. In this case, ui is treated as xed.
Standard errors in (5.1) are clustered at the council level, allowing for serial correlation
in the "it. Finally, we take account of the problem, raised by Bertand, Duo, and Mul-
lainathan (2004) that even with clustered standard errors, there can be downward bias in
the standard error in 2. To deal with this, we follow the procedure recommended in that
Government of Wales Act in 1998 and gained a limited primary legislative powers only in 2007.
18The Mundlak (1978) approach will be followed in the estimation of the random e¤ects model. In this
approach, the time-average of time-varying regerssors are included as asdditional regressors, in order to
tackle the possibility that the unobserved heterogeneity and the regressors may not be orthogonal.
19We are using the methodology proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (2008) to tackle the possibility of
non linearity in case of fractional dependent variable. In the GLM we also include council xed e¤ects.
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paper of collapsing the time dimension to before and after the treatment, and re-estimate
all of our specications. As can be seen by comparing tables A.7-A.9 in Appendix C
to Tables 6.1-6.3 and 7.1-7.2 below, the results are robust to this alternative estimation
method, providing evidence that serial correlation is not a problem.
5.2. Data
First, we discuss our choice of measures of Tit; Qit; eit for English and Welsh councils over
the period 1997-2007. In the theory, Tit is property tax revenue. The closest empirical
proxy for this is the tax requirement in the o¢ cial statistics (CIPFA(2008a)) which is
total (real) spending in the nancial year minus revenue from the revenue support grant
and other grants, and revenue from the business tax rate. We use the tax requirement,
both as a raw gure, and normalized in several ways. Specically, we also measure Tit as
a percentage of the tax requirement to the budget requirement, where the latter is actual
current expenditure that has to be nanced by formula grants (which includes the police
grant) and property tax revenue. Finally, we divide the tax requirement by the number
of equivalent band D dwellings to get an e¤ective council tax rate.
Next, we turn to the measurement of service quality Qit. We need to construct an
index of service quality consistently across both English and Welsh local governments.
To that end the BVPIs published by the Audit Commission for England and the Audit
O¢ ce for Wales are the best source of information: rst they are broadly accepted by the
local governments as measures of output quality; second we are very condent about the
comparability of these measures across local authorities since BVPIs were also chosen as
one of the building blocks of the CPA procedure.
The rst problem to solve was the absence of BVPIs for the housing and benet sector
in case of the counties, where this function is managed by districts. As DEA requires
observations for all units in all years, the only possible solution was to drop this sector
from the e¢ ciency analysis. A further problem worth discussing is the short life of many
BVPIs. Despite the fact that we could count more than 250 BVPIs published on the
website of the Audit Commission, almost all of them have been subject to some changes
after three or four years, and in many cases replaced with new indicators. There is also the
problem that after 2001-2, BVPIs were dened and measured separately in both England
and Wales, and there was very little overlap. In the end only ve indicators could be
used to measure the quality of output consistently for England and Wales; these measure
aspects of education, social care of the elderly and children, waste disposal, and central
services. These variables are dened in Table A4 of the Appendix, and summary statistics
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are given in table A5. But, it is important to note that expenditure on these categories
accounts for fully 57% of the total local government expenditure, on average20.
As is clear from that table, four of the ve BVPIs are already expressed as percentages;
we converted BVPI54 to a percentage also, and averaged it with BVPI49, thus giving an
aggregate index for social services. We then calculated Qit as the weighted average of
these four indices, where the weights used were the relative expenditures on the four ser-
vices, in real £ per pupil for education, and real £ per capita for the others, where all
monetary amounts were deated using the 2005 CPI. Summary statistics on these expen-
ditures are given in the bottom panel of Table A5. The source for the expenditure data is
from the Finance and General Statistics (FGS) and Local Government Comparative Sta-
tistics (LGCS), available on the website of the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and
Accountancy (CIPFA) from the 1997/98 to the 2007/08 nancial years (CIPFA (2008b)
and CIPFA (2008c)).
Our e¢ ciency index eit is constructed as follows. We estimate a Debreu-Farrell21
e¢ ciency index eit for each council and year in the sample using data envelopment analysis
(DEA hereafter).22 As output measures, we use the same ve BVPIs used to construct
the output index. As inputs, we use the expenditures already mentioned, corresponding
to those outputs. DEA generates two indices. The rst, the input index, eINit , has the
following intuitive interpretation. If council i was using the technology e¢ ciently at time
t, its inputs could all be scaled down by a fraction 1   eINit and it would still be able
to produce the vector of outputs yit. The second, the output index, eOUTit has a similar
interpretation: if council i was using the technology e¢ ciently at time t its outputs could
all be scaled up by an amount eOUTit , whilst using the same vector of inputs xit. Formal
denitions are given in Appendix B, and some descriptive statistics are provided in Table
A6. Finally, it is also explained in Appendix B that eINit ; e
OUT
it will generally be upward
biased. So, as also explained there, we used bootstrap methods to correct for that bias,
yielding bias-corrected versions of both eINit ; e
OUT
it .
Finally, our control variables X it are described in Table A6 of the Appendix, and can
be subdivided in the following sub-categories. First, are demographic variables, such as
20Remarkably, if one takes a less demanding view, and only requires identical BVPIs measured in
England and Wales in only one year before, and one year after, the introduction of CPA, which is
a minimal requirement for di¤erence in di¤erence analysis, there just was just one additional BVPI
available, the percentage of recycled household waste that was used to generate energy.
21Debreu (1951) and Farrell (1957).
22DEA was rst developed by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978); a complete survey of data evelop-
ment analysis can be found in Ali and Seiford (1993).
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the percentage of the total population below the age of 16 and above the age of 75, the
percentage of population that declare themselves religious, the percentage of white people,
the population density, and nally the percentage of households who own their house, the
number of band D equivalent dwellings per capita that correspond to the tax base of the
council tax and has been included as a proxy of the demand for local public services. The
second category includes a set of dummy variables to capture the impact of the ruling party
and the features of the electoral system ("all out" election every four years, or "by thirds"
system which involves more frequent elections). The third group of variables is related to
the structure of the local economy and includes: average household disposable income,
the percentage of the workforce claiming unemployment-related benets, the percentage
of people below 65 claiming disability living allowance, the percentage of VAT tax payers
in the nancial and real estate sector, the percentage of high qualied workforce, and the
percentage of workforce self employed23.
6. Empirical Results
The rst, empirical prediction of the theoretical model is that CPA should increase council
tax revenues (Proposition 2). So, we rst estimate (5.1) with Yit = Tit. As a rst pass,
Figure A.1 of Appendix D shows that the council e¤ective tax rate (the tax requirement
per equivalent band D dwelling) exhibits a clear increase in England relative to Wales
after 2002. So, we would expect 2 to be signicantly positive. For each of the three
tax measures described above, we estimate three specications of (5.1), as described in
Section 5.1 above.
Table 6.1 shows that irrespective of the estimation method and with all three tax
measures, 2 is positive and signicant at the 1% level. According to out linear estimates,
(FE and RE), the introduction of CPA raised the tax requirement by about £ 24 per
capita, or 7.5% in England relative to Wales, the tax requirement as a percentage of the
budget by about 2.5 percent in England relative to Wales, and nally raised the e¤ective
council tax rate by about £ 52, corresponding roughly to a 4 percent increase in England
relative to Wales24. For the non-linear model, the average partial e¤ect is reported, which
is the percentage change in the dependent variable caused by the treatment. So, in this
model, the e¤ect of CPA is somewhat smaller.
23Due to the absence of some data on control variables in some years, the panel is unbalanced.
24Note that the estimates of £ 24 and £ 52 are broadly consistent, using the fact that there are on
average, according to the latest statistics (CIPFA (2008a)), about 2.3 persons per dwelling in England.
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Table 6.1. Point estimates of the treatment e¤ect of CPA on council tax revenues.
Model
Tax
requirement
(real £
per capita)
(A)
Tax
requirement
(% of budget
requirement)
(B)
E¤ective council
tax rate (real £ per
band D equivalent
dwelling)
(C)
FE (linear) 23.98*** 2.487*** 52.23***
(4.99) (0.433) (11.15)
RE (linear) 23.97*** 2.487*** 52.23***
(5.03) (0.435) (11.20)
GLM (non linear) (1) n.a. 1.814*** n.a.
(0.187)
Observations 1846 1846 1846
Number of councils 170 170 170
Control variables yes yes yes
Quadratic trend yes yes yes
Clustered standard errors in brackets. *** signicant at 1%. Coe¢ cient point estimates are interpreted
as follows: £ per capita in column (A), % change in column (B), and £ per dwelling in column (C).
(1) Point estimates are expressed as average partial e¤ects
Second, we estimate 2 in (5.1) when the dependent variable is our service quality
index. As a rst step, Figure A.2 in Appendix D shows clearly that the output index
rose faster in England than in Wales after the introduction of CPA, so we would expect
2 > 0. Point estimates of 2 are reported in the rst column of Table 6.2 using the same
econometric specications as in Table 6.1. Also in this case, irrespective of the estimation
method, it is possible to observe a positive and statistically signicant e¤ect of CPA on
the level of outputs: on average, after the introduction of CPA, the aggregate output
increased by 4% in English councils compared to Welsh local authorities.
But, as remarked in Section 2, a concern for us is that secondary school performance,
as measured by the percentage of pupils achieving between A and C in GCSE exams, is
a major component of our output index (with a weight of 63%). Burgess et. al. (2010)
show that this measure of performance was impacted by school league tables, which were
abolished in Wales it the same year in which CPA was introduced in England. To deal
with this problem, we also test whether CPA increased our output index excluding edu-
cation. The results are in column 2 of Table 6.2: we nd that in our baseline xed e¤ects
specication, the e¤ect of CPA is still signicantly positive but smaller in magnitude.
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We believe that this is evidence that both CPA and other "service-specic" performance
indicators such as school league tables can have positive e¤ects on output.
The other columns of Table 6.2 display the results of the same exercise conducted
considering the quality measures of each sector. So, for English local authorities, in
general, there is empirical evidence of a positive e¤ect of CPA on all quality measures,
with the exception of the percentage of household waste recycled. Thus, our results are
again broadly consistent with the theory.
Table 6.2. Point estimates of the treatment e¤ect of CPA on service quality.
Model Output measures
Aggregated
output
Aggregated
output (no
education)
Education
Social
service
Central
services
Environ-
ment
FE (linear) 4.13*** 1.16* 5.63*** 1.50** 3.74* -4.98***
(0.62) (0.70) (0.83) (0.73) (2.26) (0.90)
RE (linear) 4.11*** 1.15 5.62*** 1.47** 3.77* -4.97***
(0.63) (0.71) (0.84) (0.74) (2.27) (0.91)
GLM 4.08*** 1.32*** 5.80*** 1.48*** 3.54*** -5.26***
(non linear) (1) (0.39) (0.18) (0.50) (0.52) (1.16) (0.73)
Observations 1746 1746 1846 1797 1783 1804
No. of councils 170 170 170 170 170 170
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes
Quadratic trend yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clustered standard errors in brackets. *** signicant at 1%; ** signicant at 5%; * signicant at 10%. Coe¢ cient
point estimates are interpreted as percentage change in output index due to CPA.
(1) Point estimates are expressed as average partial e¤ects.
We turn to look at the e¤ect of CPA on our e¢ ciency indices. Figure A.3 of Appendix
D shows the path of the e¢ ciency index in England and Wales (average between input and
output approach) between 1997 and 2007. In both countries the initial decreasing trend
in e¢ ciency reversed its course after the introduction of CPA, and although the initial gap
between Welsh and English councils is completely closed in the last year, there is no clear
evidence of a positive impact of CPA on the e¢ ciency of English local authorities. This
suggests an insignicant 2, which is in fact what we nd. Our econometric specications
are the same as in the previous two tables, except for the third specication. In this case,
to account for the possibility of non-linearity, we exploit the fact that the DEA indices
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of e¢ ciency have an ordinal meaning; therefore we use as a dependent variable a binary
indicator that will take value one if the council is ranked above the 50th percentile in the
distribution of the DEA e¢ ciency scores, and zero otherwise. This gives a random e¤ect
probit model estimated using the unconditional MLE estimator.25
Looking at Table 6.3, there is no empirical evidence in favour of a an impact of CPA
on the e¢ ciency of English councils. The coe¢ cient of the treatment e¤ect is statistically
signicant only in case of RE probit model in relation to the input approach, however the
magnitude of the estimate tell us that after the introduction of CPA the probability of
observing a council ranked in the upper 50th percentile of the e¢ ciency index distribution
decreased by 0.3%, a very small number that leads us to the conclusion that the intro-
duction of CPA did not stimulate any change in the e¢ ciency of English local authorities
in delivering public services. Finally, our estimates conrm the presence of a generalized
quadratic trend in case of the linear model.
Table 6.3. Point estimates of the treatment e¤ect of CPA on e¢ ciency.
Model Input approach Output approach
no bootstrap bootstrap no bootstrap bootstrap
FE (linear) (1) -2.86 -2.88 1.08 0.68
(1.91) (2.20) (0.88) (1.42)
RE (linear) (1) -2.95 -3.32 1.05 0.86
(1.89) (2.17) (0.88) (1.38)
RE probit (non linear) (2) -0.04 -0.30*** -0.03 0.03
(0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.13)
Observations 1548 987 1548 932
Number of councils 170 170 170 169
Control variables yes yes yes yes
Quadratic trend yes yes yes yes
Clustered standard errors in brackets. *** signicant at 1%; ** signicant at 5%; * signicant at 10%.
(1) Coe¢ cient point estimates are interpreted as percentage change in e¢ ciency index due to CPA.
(2) Dependent variable is 1 in year t i¤ council is ranked in the upper 50th percentile of the e¢ ciency
distribution in year t. Coe¢ cient point estimates are interpreted as percentage change in the probability
of being ranked in the 50th percentile of the e¢ ciency index distribution.
25It is important to note that also in this case, like for the RE model, the Mundlak (1978) approach
will be followed in order to tackle the possibility that the unobserved heterogeneity and the regressors
may not be orthogonal.
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7. Heterogenous Treatment E¤ects
In this Section, we investigate how - if at all - the e¤ect of CPA depends qualitatively on
LA characteristics. We investigate this by estimating the following specication:
eit = 1CPAt + 2(CPAt Di) + 3(Zit  CPAt) + 4(CPAt Di  Zit)
+ 0Xit + ui + "it
where Zit is a local government characteristic, that could, for example, proxy for one of
the theoretical characteristics described in Proposition 2. So, this allows us to estimate
the heterogeneous treatment e¤ects of CPA. Note that this specication, via the inclusion
of Zit CPAt; and CPAt Di Zit allows for characteristic Zit to have separate e¤ects
on eit in both England and Wales before and after CPA.26 Therefore, in this case, the
parameter of interest is 4.
The rst possible heterogenous e¤ect that we investigate is whether CPA had a "catch-
up" e¤ect - that is, whether it had a greater impact on badly-performing councils in
England than on well-performing councils. To do this, we rank councils in England and
Wales by their average e¢ ciency score over the period prior to the introduction of CPA
i.e. 1997-1999.27 We then split the sample at the median, with Zit = 1 if the council is
below the median time-averaged e¢ ciency score. So, in this case, Zit is independent of
i: In Table 7.1 below, we present results on the estimates of 4 for council tax, output, and
e¢ ciency. The format of the table is in line with those used previously; that is we report
the estimate of 4 for xed and random e¤ects specications. Moreover for the aggregate
output and the e¢ ciency index we also consider two di¤erent non-linear specications as
we did respectively in table 6.3 and 6.2 .
In column 1 of table 7.1, we see evidence that relative to "good" English councils,
ine¢ cient English councils increased council tax by signicantly more (around £ 14 in
terms of the real per capita tax requirement) during the CPA period. As column 2 shows,
this is reected in an increased relative output performance of more that 2% in terms of
aggregate output, although it should be said that this e¤ect is less signicant if education
is excluded (not reported). Perhaps as a result of these two countervailing e¤ects, there is
no evidence that "bad" English councils increase their e¢ ciency relative to "good" English
26Note that Xit includes also Zit:
27Recall that data for Wales on the e¢ ciency index is missing for the year 2000, because we lack output
information.
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councils. So, there appears to be catch-up in output, but no evidence of a catch-up e¤ect
on e¢ ciency.
Table 7.1. Heterogeneous treatment e¤ect of CPA on taxation, aggregate output
and e¢ ciency for initially ine¢ cient English LAs.
Model
Tax
requirement
(real £
per capita)
(A)
Aggregated
output
(B)
E¢ ciency
output
approach
(C)
FE (linear) 13.61* 2.19*** -1.40
(7.90) (0.64) (1.65)
RE (linear) 14.50* 2.43*** -1.43
(7.91) (0.62) (1.13)
GLM (non linear) (1) 0.04***
(0.01)
RE probit (non linear) (2) -0.15
(0.14)
Observations 1846 1746 1539
Number of councils 170 170 169
Control variables yes yes yes
Quadratic trend yes yes yes
Clustered standard errors in brackets. *** signicant at 1%; ** signicant at 5%; * signicant at 10%.
(1) Point estimates are expressed as average partial e¤ects.
(2) Percentage change in the probability of being ranked in the 50th percentile of the e¢ ciency index
distribution after 1% change in the variable interacted with the treatment e¤ect.
Our second approach to heterogenous treatment e¤ects is theory-motivated; we look
for reasonable empirical proxies for the variables that according to Proposition 2, might
a¤ect the sign of de
dB
. First, we begin with , which is unambiguously predicted to increase
the e¢ ciency of an incentive scheme. Recall that this is the politicians perceived tax price.
Suppose (reasonably) this is equal, or close to, the median tax price in the jurisdiction.
Given the tax is a property tax, then  is lower, other things equal, if a larger fraction of
the adult population who do not pay the property tax, or pay some reduced fraction of the
council tax. In the UK, the main groups who do not pay the full amount of council tax on
properties they own or rent are the unemployed and those on low incomes, who are eligible
for Council Tax Benet (CTB). For example, in 2010, 68% of those in receipt of CTB
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were claiming Jobseekers allowance, incapacity benet, or income support. We do not
have data on CTB or income support recipients by council, so, we proxy  (inversely) by
the % of the workforce in receipt of Jobseekers allowance, plus % of the adult population
under 65 in receipt of incapacity benet.
The estimates of 4 are shown in Table 7.2 below. We expect 4 < 0 as our variable
is an inverse measure of the tax price. The format of the table is the same as in the
case of Table 6.3. That is, we report the estimate of 4 for xed and random e¤ects
specications, and for a probit where the dependent variable is 1 if unit of observation i
was ranked in the top 50th percentile of the distribution, and zero otherwise. In case of the
linear models 4 point estimates can be interpreted as the percentage increase in e¢ ciency
observed in English local authorities, given a 1% increase in Zit, after the introduction
of CPA. In case of non linear model 4 point estimates are displayed in terms of average
partial e¤ect, i.e. they exhibit the percentage change in the probability of observing a
council ranked e¢ cient (i.e. above the 50th percentile in terms of DEA e¢ ciency scores)
after 1% increase in Zit that follows the introduction of CPA in English local authorities.
We see that the estimated 4 is mostly negative, and is certainly negative whenever it is
signicant.
Table 7.2. Heterogeneous treatment e¤ect, % jobseekers allowance and incapacity benet.
Model Input approach Output approach
no bootstrap bootstrap no bootstrap bootstrap
FE (linear) (1) -0.041 0.028 0.007 -0.010
(0.074) (0.082) (0.025) (0.029)
RE (linear) (1) -0.108* -0.075 -0.034** -0.049**
(0.062) (0.065) (0.016) (0.020)
RE probit (non linear) (2) -0.260 -0.165 -0.510** -0.661*
(0.241) (0.261) (0.255) (0.343)
Observations 1548 987 1548 932
Number of councils 170 170 170 169
Control variables yes yes yes yes
Quadratic trend yes yes yes yes
Clustered standard errors in brackets. *** signicant at 1%; ** signicant at 5%; * signicant at 10%.
(1) Percentage change in e¢ ciency after 1% change in the variable interacted with treatment e¤ect.
(2) Percentage change in the probability of being ranked in the 50th percentile of the e¢ ciency index
distribution after 1% change in the variable interacted with the treatment e¤ect.
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Next, recall that Proposition 2 predicts that an increase in B can decrease e¢ ciency,
and generally, will have some impact either way. The introduction, after 2004, of the
"harder-test" procedure for the computation of CPA scores allows to test the impact of B
on e¢ ciency. In particular, it is quite plausible to assume that the intensity of the bonus
(B) decreased after the new regime became e¤ective since it was more di¢ cult to obtain a
high CPA score. In this last case Zit corresponds to a dummy which takes value one after
2004, and the point estimates reported in table 7.3 support our claim providing robust
empirical evidence in favour of a positive e¤ect of the "harder-test" on LAs e¢ ciency.
Table 7.3. Heterogeneous treatment e¤ect, "harder test".
Model Input approach Output approach
no bootstrap bootstrap no bootstrap bootstrap
FE (linear) (1) 2.67* 5.70*** 2.06*** 1.78***
(1.58) (1.84) (0.48) (0.66)
RE (linear) (1) 2.65* 5.81*** 2.06*** 1.765***
(1.59) (1.91) (0.48) (0.64)
RE probit (non linear) (2) 0.045 0.24*** 0.19** 0.22
(0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.14)
Observations 1548 987 1548 932
Number of councils 170 170 170 169
Control variables yes yes yes yes
Quadratic trend yes yes yes yes
Clustered standard errors in brackets. *** signicant at 1%; ** signicant at 5%; * signicant at 10%.
(1) Percentage change in e¢ ciency after 1% change in the variable interacted with treatment e¤ect.
(2) Percentage change in the probability of being ranked in the 50th percentile of e¢ ciency index
distribution after 1% change in the variable interacted with the treatment e¤ect.
A third variable that can be empirically proxied is the degree of electoral competition.
Our available measure of this is the vote share of the party with the largest number
of votes at the last election, minus the vote share of the party with the second most
number of votes. Call this the vote gap. What does this correspond to in the theory?
The di¤erence in vote shares between the incumbent and the challenger is q(2s   1);
where s = 1
2
(1 +  + 1) is the share of voters voting for the incumbent when voting is
"non-random" i.e. when Q1 is observed, from (4.7), using et = t: Conditional on 1; the
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di¤erence in vote shares, between the winner and the loser is thus
qE [ + 1 j   1 ] + qE [ ( + 1) j <  1 ]
=
q
2
[
21
2
+ 1 +
2
2
]  q
2
[ 
2
1
2
+ 1   
2
2
]
=
q
2
[21 + 
2]
Taking the expectation with respect to 1; we see that theoretical equivalent of the ob-
served vote gap is
 =
q
2
E1 [
2
1 + 
2] =
q
2
[2 + 
2]
This is non-monotonic in  : increasing when  >
p
2 ; and decreasing otherwise: Now,
from Proposition 2, e¢ ciency is predicted to be unambiguously increasing in : So, our
empirical prediction is that the e¢ ciency e¤ect of CPA should depend on the vote gap,
but may be decreasing or increasing.
Table 7.4. Heterogeneous treatment e¤ect, vote gap.
Model Input approach Output approach
no bootstrap bootstrap no bootstrap bootstrap
FE (linear) (1) 0.025* 0.039* 0.003 0.008
(0.013) (0.022) (0.006) (0.008)
RE (linear) (1) 0.010 0.016 0.000 0.006
(0.010) (0.014) (0.004) (0.005)
RE probit (non linear) (2) 0.095 0.206* 0.058 0.127
(0.070) (0.108) (0.081) (0.113)
Observations 1045 628 1045 632
Number of councils 170 170 170 169
Control variables yes yes yes yes
Quadratic trend yes yes yes yes
Clustered standard errors in brackets. *** signicant at 1%; ** signicant at 5%; * signicant at 10%.
(1) Percentage change in e¢ ciency after 1% change in the variable interacted with treatment e¤ect.
(2) Percentage change in the probability of being ranked in the 50th percentile of e¢ ciency index
distribution after 1% change in the variable interacted with the treatment e¤ect.
Some evidence of a signicant e¤ect is given in Table 7.4; the e¤ect of the vote gap on
e¢ ciency via CPA is always positive, and sometimes signicant.
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8. Conclusions
This paper has studied Comprehensive Performance Assessment, an explicit incentive
scheme for local government in England. A simple theoretical political agency model pre-
dicted that CPA should increase service quality and local taxation, but have an ambiguous
e¤ect on the e¢ ciency of service provision. We tested these predictions using a di¤erence
in di¤erence approach, using Welsh local authorities as a control group, exploiting the fact
that local authorities in Wales were not subject to the same CPA regime. We also con-
structed indices of service quality and e¢ ciency, using Best Value Performance Indicators
as well as expenditures on di¤erent categories of services. We estimate that CPA increased
the e¤ective band D council tax rate in England relative to Wales by 4%, and increased
our index of service quality output also by about 4%, but had no signicant e¤ect on our
e¢ ciency indices. There is evidence of heterogenous e¤ects of CPA on e¢ ciency. Relative
to "good" English councils, initially ine¢ cient English councils increased council tax by
signicantly more during the CPA period. This is also reected in an increased relative
output performance. Perhaps as a result of these two countervailing e¤ects, there is no
evidence that "bad" English councils increase their e¢ ciency relative to "good" English
councils. So, there appears to be catch-up in output, but no evidence of a catch-up e¤ect
on e¢ ciency. Finally, consistently with the theory, the "harder test" from 2005-8 having
a much bigger e¤ect, and also the e¤ect of CPA on e¢ ciency seems to be more negative
in local authorities where there are larger numbers of voters who face a zero "tax price".
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A. Appendix
A.1. Appendix A: Proofs of Propositions and Other Results
Computation of Equation (4.7). Assume that Qt has been observed by voters. Con-
ditional on t; the fraction of voters who vote for the incumbent is
Pr["t   t   et + c] =
1 + t + 
e
t   c
2
= ft;
So, the incumbent only wins if ft  12 ; i:e: t   et . So, the probability that the
incumbent wins is
Pr (t   et ) = Pr (t  et ) =
1
2
+
et

(A.1)
Now from (4.5) and (4.1), we have
et = t + f(at; Tt)  f(aet ; Tt) (A.2)
Finally, the overall probability of a win is
pt = (1  q)1
2
+ q:Pr (t   et ) (A.3)
Combining (A.1),(A.2), (A.3), the result then follows.
Proof of Proposition 1. From total di¤erentiation of (4.9), (4.10), and application of
Cramers rule, we have:
da1
dB
=
 fafTT (! +B) + faTfT (! +B + qV=)
D
(A.4)
dT1
dB
=
 fTfaa(! +B + qV=) + faTfa(! +B)
D
whereD = (faafTT f 2aT > 0)(!+B)(!+B+qV=) > 0 by the second-order conditions to
the incumbents optimization problem. [This is automatically satised as faafTT f 2aT > 0;
from strict concavity of f; and !;B; qV= > 0]: So, as faT  0; we see that da1dB ; dT1dB > 0:
Also, in the event of a change in q :
da1
dq
=
 fafTT (! +B) V
D
;
dT1
dq
=
faTfa(! +B)
V

D
(A.5)
A similar argument then proves that da1
dq
; dT1
dq
> 0: 
Proof of Proposition 2. From (4.12), we can write:
de
dq
 0, fa
da1
dq
fT
dT1
dq
>
1  fT
fT
, fT > 1
1 +
fa
da1
dq
fT
dT1
dq
(A.6)
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But from (A.5), and f = aT ;we have
fa
da1
dq
fT
dT1
dq
=
1  

(A.7)
Combining (A.6), (A.7) gives the condition fT > : Again from (4.12), we have:
de
dB
 0, fa
da1
dB
fT
dT1
dB
>
1  fT
fT
, fT > 1
1 +
fa
da1
dB
fT
dT1
dB
(A.8)
But from (4.11), and f = aT ;we have
fa
da1
dB
fT
dT1
dB
=
f 2afTT (! +B) + fafaTfT (! +B + qV=)
f 2Tfaa(! +B + qV=) + fTfaTfa(! +B)
(A.9)
=
(2  1

)(! +B) + qV=
(2  1

)((! +B) + (1  1

)qV=
Combining (A.8) and (A.9) gives (4.13). 
A.2. Appendix B: Construction of the E¢ ciency Indices
Assume that the LA has q outputs that can be produced from l inputs, and y;x denote
the output and input vectors respectively. The production possibility set is S = f(x;y) 2
Rl+q+ j y  F (x)g; where F characterizes the e¢ cient frontier. Then the input requirement
set X(y) = fx 2 Rl+ j (x;y) 2 Sg is the the set of inputs required to obtain a particular
output quantity. Then for each input-output combination for LA i at time t, the associated
e¢ ciency measure is eit = minfe 2 < j exit 2 X(yit)g: So, in the case of the input
approach, eit is the solution of the following linear program providing the e¢ ciency score
for the council i in period t:
min
e2<;2<NT
e s:t: exit > X; Y > yit;  > 0; 0 = 1 (A.10)
where xit is the vector of inputs of council i at time t, X is lNT the matrix of inputs of
all N LAs over all T years, Y is the qNT matrix of outputs of N LAs over all T years,
 is a NT  1 vector of optimal weights, yit is the vector of outputs of council i at time t,
and 0 is a 1NT vector of (1; :::1). The last constraint is important for imposing variable
returns to scale. Note that we are taking a pooled approach where only one production
frontier is estimated and each region is compared also with itself in another year. In this
way it is possible to use all the N  T observations.
33
The output approach is similar; the output possibility set Y (x) = fy 2 Rq+ j (x;y) 2
Sg is the the set of output vectors that are possible given input vector x: Then the output
e¢ ciency measure is 1=eit; where eit = maxfe 2 < j eyit 2 Y (xit)g: It is calculated using
a similar linear program to (A.10).
The main problem with DEA is that it tends to produce an upward-biased estimate of
the true Debreu-Farrell measure of technical e¢ ciency. The bias is due to the piece-wise
shape of the DEA frontier that approximates the true unobserved frontier. As a result
DEA underestimates the distance of all input/output combinations from the true frontier.
Typically the bias, as well as the precision of the its estimation, become smaller as the
number of observations increases and becomes larger as we increase the dimensions of
the production function (see Kneip et al. 1998). In this study, although more than 1500
observations are available, considering both English and Welsh councils in the production
function, a "bias corrected" measure of e¢ ciency, ~eit along with its interval of condence
at the 95% level of signicance, CIit; has been computed following the bootstrap method-
ology developed by Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000).
After estimating our bias corrected measure of e¢ ciency we found that the Spearman
correlation between eit and ~eit is 0.96 and 0.93 in cases of input and output approaches
respectively. Therefore, given the large number of observations, the magnitude of the
bias is not a big issue in this case, in fact eit and ~eit provide very similar regression
results. The main concern is that ~eit may be imprecisely estimated. The precision of the
estimate of ~eit is measured by the width of the CIit. So, to check the robustness of our
bias-corrected measure of e¢ ciency, we drop observations where the e¢ ciency index is
too imprecisely measured. To do this, rst calculate the quartiles of the distribution of
the ~eit. We then retain observation ~eit only if CIit lies entirely in one quartile; otherwise,
we drop it. As a result, we have constructed a sub-sample of statistically "signicant"
bias-corrected indices of e¢ ciency. As shown in Table A1 is possible to keep 64% of the
DEA bias-corrected e¢ ciency indices in case of input approach, and 60% in case of output
approach.
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Table A1. Statistically signicant e¢ ciency scores.
Type of local authorities
Total
observations
Input Approach Output Approach
eit
NxT
Statist.
Signicant %
Statist.
Signicant %
English Counties 329 203 61% 202 61%
London Boroughs 304 228 75% 190 62%
English Metr. Districts 333 192 57% 196 59%
English Unitary Authorities 407 264 64% 253 62%
Welsh Unitary Authorities 179 102 56% 94 53%
Total 1552 989 64% 935 60%
A.3. Appendix C: Tables
Table A2. CPA aggregation rule, rst three rounds.
Counties London, MD, UA
Performance score Category score Performance score Category score
Less then 24 points 1 Less then 30 points 1
24 to 29 points 2 30 to 37 points 2
30 to 36 points 3 38 to 45 points 3
More than 36 points 4 More than 45 points 4
Councilsability Councilsperformance score on core services
to improve
1 2 3 4
1 poor poor weak n.a.
2 poor weak fair good
3 weak fair good excellent
4 n.a. good excellent excellent
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Table A3. The Harder Test aggregation rule.
Corporate Level 1 assessment Level 2 assessment CPA
asses- (children and adults social (environment, culture, nal
sment care, use of resources) housing and benet) score
4 None less than 3 None less than 2 4 stars
4 None less than 2 No more than one less than 2 3 stars
4 No more than one less than 2 No more than one less than 2 2 stars
4 Any other combination Any other combination 1 star
3 None less than 3 None less than 3 4 stars
3 None less than 2 None less than 2 3 stars
3 None less than 2 No more than one less than 2 2 stars
3 Any other combination Any other combination 1 star
2 None less than 3 None less than 3 3 stars
2 None less than 2 None less than 2 2 stars
2 No more than one less than 2 No more than one less than 2 1 star
2 Any other combination Any other combination 0 stars
1 None less than 3 None less than 2 2 stars
1 None less than 2 None less than 2 1 star
1 Any other combination Any other combination 0 stars
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Table A4. Description of output variables.
Service BVPI code Description Period
Secondary
Education BVPI38
Percentage of 15 year old pupils in schools
maintained by the local education authority
achieving ve or more GCSEs
at grades A*-C or equivalent
Average over the
current and the
three following
academic years
Social services
(children)
BVPI49
The percentage of looked after children with
no more than three placements during the last
nancial year (BVPI49)
Financial year
Social services
(elderly)
BVPI54
Older people helped to live at home per 1000
population aged 65 or over (BPVI54)
Financial year
Waste
disposal
BVPI82a
Percentage of household waste arising which
have been sent by the Authority for
recycling (BPVI82a)
Financial year
Central
services
BVPI8
Percentage of invoices paid by the Authority
within 30 days of receipt or within the
agreed payment terms (BVPI8)
Financial year
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Table A5. Descriptive statistics, output and input variables.
Mean Std. Dev. Observations
England Wales England Wales England Wales
Output variables
Secondary education 51.10 51.04 9.51 6.43 1373 179
Social service (children) 11.92 9.36 4.21 4.67 1373 179
Social service (adults) 85.51 100.29 26.97 36.83 1373 179
Waste disposal 11.66 14.35 5.67 8.75 1373 179
Central services 82.80 82.77 10.99 9.62 1373 179
Input variables
Secondary
education
(real £ per pupil)
3503 3203 728 392 1373 179
Social service,
children and adults
(real £ per capita)
205 209 76 56 1373 179
Waste disposal
(real £ per capita)
21 22 7 9 1373 179
Central services
(real £ per capita)
19 31 11 14 1373 179
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Table A6. Control variables and dependent variables, descriptive statistics.
Mean Std. Dev. Observations
England Wales England Wales England Wales
Tax requirement (real £ per capita) 300 244 71 55 1608 242
E¤ective council tax rate (real £ per dwelling) 1087 796 197 165 1608 242
eIN 0.77 0.85 0.14 0.10 1373 179
eOUT 0.94 0.96 0.04 0.03 1373 179
eIN (after bootstrap) 0.69 0.76 0.12 0.09 887 102
eOUT (after bootstrap) 0.92 0.95 0.04 0.03 841 94
% age 0 - 16 22.40 22.60 1.75 1.11 1369 179
% age over 75 3.21 8.47 0.65 1.18 1369 179
% religious 77.70 73.82 4.50 4.17 1369 179
% white 89.12 98.34 12.80 1.75 1369 179
% tenure (house ownership) 66.84 70.98 11.29 3.82 1369 179
Band D equivalent dwelling (% per capita) 33.85 35.39 5.23 4.30 1369 179
Population density (persons per hectare) 24.38 4.20 26.84 4.84 1369 179
Conservative dummy (majority of seats) 0.23 0.04 0.42 0.20 1369 179
Labour dummy (majority of seats) 0.42 0.53 0.50 0.50 1369 179
Lib. Dem. dummy (majority of seats) 0.07 0.00 0.26 0.00 1369 179
No overall control dummy 0.28 0.43 0.45 0.50 1369 179
Election by thirds dummy 0.37 0 0.48 0 1369 179
Disposable income (real £ per capita) 12818 11025 3024 1087 1369 179
% rms in the nancial sector 29.67 17.81 8.89 6.52 1369 179
% of unemployment related benet 3.09 2.95 1.62 0.99 1369 179
% attendance allowance below age 65 4.74 8.25 1.95 2.54 1369 179
% high qualied workforce 5.12 3.51 2.32 1.18 1369 179
% self employed work force 7.93 7.98 2.22 3.40 1369 179
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Table A7. Treatment e¤ect of CPA on council tax measures, collapse to pre
and post reform periods.
Model
Tax
requirement
(real £
per capita)
(A)
Tax
requirement
(% of budget
requirement)
(B)
E¤ective council
tax rate (real £ per
band D equivalent
dwelling)
(C)
FE (linear) 15.47* 2.23*** 29.87*
(8.79) (0.84) (17.14)
RE (linear) 23.60*** 3.38*** 39.18**
(8.94) (0.88) (17.46)
GLM (non linear) (1) n.a. 4.28*** n.a.
(1.22)
Observations 340 340 340
Number of councils 170 170 170
Control variables yes yes yes
Clustered standard errors in brackets. *** signicant at 1%. Coe¢ cient point estimates are interpreted
as follows: £ per capita in column (A), % change in column (B), and £ per dwelling in column (C).
(1) Point estimates are in terms of average partial e¤ect.
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Table A8. Point estimates of the treatment e¤ect of CPA on service quality, collapse
to pre and post reform periods.
Model Output measures
Aggregated
output
Aggregated
output (no
education)
Education
Social
service
Central
services
Environ-
ment
FE (linear) 5.34*** 1.44* 9.01*** 2.02* 2.86 -7.04***
(0.66) (0.83) (0.97) (1.91) (3.20) (1.16)
RE (linear) 5.66*** 1.35* 8.56*** 2.02* 4.52 -6.54***
(0.65) (0.82) (0.95) (1.22) (3.18) (1.29)
GLM 5.67*** 1.53** 9.14*** 1.79** 2.60 -6.05***
(non linear) (1) (0.46) (0.64) (0.69) (0.76) (2.03) (0.87)
Observations 340 340 340 340 340 340
No. of councils 170 170 170 170 170 170
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes
*** signicant at 1%; ** signicant at 5%; * signicant at 10%.
Coe¢ cient point estimates are interpreted as percentage change in output index due to CPA.
(1) Point estimates are in terms of average partial e¤ect.
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Table A9.Treatment e¤ect of CPA on e¢ ciency, collapse pre and post reform
periods (only raw DEA e¢ ciency indices).
Model Homogeneous
e¤ect (1)
Heterogeneous
e¤ect % incapacity
benet and
jobseekers
allowance (2)
Heterogeneous
e¤ect vote gap
(2)
Input app. Output app. Input app. Output app. Input app. Output app.
FE (linear) (1) -1.47 1.15 -0.064 -0.013 0.016 0.002
(2.15) (1.22) (0.067) (0.024) (0.013) (0.007)
RE (linear) (1) -2.16 1.15 -0.102* -0.052** 0.001 0.001
(2.12) (1.03) (0.061) (0.019) (0.015) (0.004)
Observations 340 340 340 340 340 340
No. of councils 170 170 170 170 170 170
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes
*** signicant at 1%; ** signicant at 5%; * signicant at 10%.
(1) Ppercentage change in e¢ ciency index due to CPA.
(2) Percentage change in e¢ ciency after 1% change in the variable interacted with treatment e¤ect.
A.4. Appendix D: Testing the Common Trend Assumption
The fundamental identifying assumption underlying the validity of the quasi-experimental
setting is that the variable of interest should follow the same time path in control and the
treated group in the absence of the treatment. Figures A.1, A.2, and A.3 show that the
e¤ective council tax rate, the aggregate output, and the e¢ ciency indices where following
a similar path in England and Wales before the introduction of CPA. We test for this
hypothesis more formally by running, for the pre-treatment period from 1997 to 2000, the
regression
Y it = t + t(t Di) + 0Xit + ui + vit (A.11)
In (A.11) Y it is the variable of interest, t is the set of year dummies, Di is a dummy
for English councils, and t is the parameter of interest. So, given that CPA started in
2001, the hypothesis that the variable of interest follows the same time path is simply
H0 : 97; 98; 99; 00 = 0: As reported in the following Table A.10 the null hypothesis of
zero interaction can not be rejected in most of our tests. As reported in the table, p-values
were below the critical threshold of the 10% signicance level only for the output variables
related to social services and the environment sector, and for the raw index of e¢ ciency
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in case of output approach.
Table A.10. P-values related to the null hypothesis H0 : 97; 98; 99; 00 = 0.
Variables p-value* DiD test
Aggregate output 0.63 ok
Education (BVPI38) 0.83 ok
Social services (BVPI49) 0.01 no
Social services (BVPI54) 0.02 no
Environment (BVPI82a) 0.01 no
Central services (BVPI8) 0.32 ok
Tax requirement (real £ per capita) 0.36 ok
Tax requirement (% of budget requirement) 0.93 ok
E¤ective council tax rate (real £ per dwelling) 0.62 ok
eIN 0.72 ok
eOUT 0.06 no
eIN+ bootstrap procedure 0.15 ok
eOUT+ bootstrap procedure 0.27 ok
*Probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of similar time path between England and
Wales in the pre-treatment period when the null is true.
Figure A.1: E¤ective Council tax rate.
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Figure A.2: Aggregate output.
Figure A.3: E¢ ciency, raw DEA indices,
average between input and output approach.
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